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This article discusses the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v BM1 in which the Court had 
been asked to address whether consent could provide a defence to extreme body 
modification procedures, including tongue splitting. It considers the reasoning advanced 
by the Court in rejecting consent as a defence and questions whether our continuing 
reliance on Brown and the category-based exceptions provides a satisfactory method of 
delineating which activities can be lawfully consented to. It suggests that the decision has 
done little to clarify the legal position of body modifications which result in less serious 
harm and concludes that this area of the law is still ripe for reform.  
 
Introduction 
It is a quarter of a century since the House of Lords handed down their decision in Brown2 
and their approval of the principle that consensual acts causing bodily harm are, prima 
facie, unlawful unless they fall within an exception recognised at common law continues 
to cause consternation and confusion. The exceptional categories, discussed below, are 
less than clear and it is for the courts to decide when faced with any novel circumstance 
whether there is a good reason to allow consent to negate liability.  
In BM3 the Court of Appeal was asked to rule on whether consent was available as a 
defence to a novel activity, extreme body modification procedures - including tongue 
splitting and the removal of an ear. This was the first time the Court of Appeal had been 
asked to address the lawfulness of commercial body modifications. 
The phrase ‘body modification’ has typically been used to describe a wide range of 
procedures, from cosmetic surgery and male circumcision to tattooing and piercing. The 
epithet of ‘extreme’ has typically been used to denote non-therapeutic aesthetic body 
modification procedures offered by tattooists and piercers. These include procedures such 
as scarification (the scratching or cutting of the skin to create a pattern), branding (the 
burning of the skin to create a pattern), dermal implants (materials placed beneath the 
                                                             
1 BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560; [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883; [2018] Crim. L.R. 847. The appellant pleaded guilty at 
Wolverhampton Crown Court, 12 February 2019. 
2 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 (HL). 
3 BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560; [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883. The appellant pleaded guilty at Wolverhampton Crown 
Court, 12 February 2019.  
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skin to create a pattern or to provide an anchor for jewellery) and ear pointing (the removal 
of the cartilage at the top of the ear to create a pointed pixie-like appearance). ‘Body 
modification’ will be used in the following discussion in place of ‘extreme body modification’ 
as this is the phrase the Court of Appeal has adopted.  
As body modification procedures have become increasingly popular, many high street 
tattooing and piercing studios have begun to offer these additional services. The 
availability of these modification procedures has not been hidden from public view; the 
procedures and their prices are advertised on the premises of body modifiers, on their 
business websites4  and have even been broadcast online.5 These procedures are no longer 
marginalised, they are – although not mainstream – accepted practices amongst a 
subculture.6  
Premises and practitioners offering ear-piercing or tattooing amongst their services must 
be registered under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 19827 (as 
amended by s.120 and Sch 6 of the Local Government Act 2003) and the requisite 
standards of safety and hygiene must be maintained. Body modifications do not fall under 
the terms of this licencing regime as these are not procedures which are recognised or 
regulated by local authorities. Body modifications are, then, unregulated, and the legality 
of these procedures had, until M reached the Court of Appeal, gone largely unquestioned.8 
The few commentators who had addressed this area of the law had hypothesised that, if 
a prosecution was taken, the courts would follow the well-embedded principle in Brown, 
but would recognise body modification procedures as an exceptional category out of 
respect for personal autonomy.9 Yet, in a decision which may have come as a surprise to 
both legal commentators and body modifiers, the Court of Appeal ruled that body 
                                                             
4 For examples of the services offered at the time of writing see for example, Bodycraft, available at 
http://bodycrafttattoo.com/body-modifications/ (accessed 20 July 2018); Origin Arts, available at: 
www.theoriginarts.co.uk/body-modifications.html (accessed 20 July 2018); Tattooed Lady, available at: 
www.tattooed-lady.co.uk/body-mods. (accessed 20 July 2018); Holier than Thou, available at: www.holier-
than-thou.co.uk/services/scarification/ (accessed 20 July 2018); Skin Seamstress, available at: 
skinseamstress.com/wp/price-list/ (accessed 20 July 2018). 
5 http://www.channel4.com/programmes/body-mods where the appellant in M (B) was featured in a series of 
online programmes detailing body modifications.  
6 The term ‘subculture’ is being used here to describe a group that differs from wider society and develops its 
own values and norms.  
7 Local authorities in London are subject to the London Local Authority Act 1991. 
8 The author had raised the issue previously. See S. Pegg, ‘The new tattoo: is body branding legal?’ The 
Conversation 28 July 2015. Available at: https://theconversation.com/the-new-tattoo-is-body-branding-legal-
44690 (accessed 12 July 2018). 
9 See S. Oultram, “All hail the new flesh: some thoughts on scarification, children and adults” (2009) 35(10) 
Journal of Medical Ethics at 607; P. Lehane, “Assault, consent and body art: a review of the law relating to 
assault and consent in the UK and the practice of body art” (2005) 4 J Environ Health Res 41. The issue is also 
briefly considered in S. Cooper and M. James “Entertainment - the painful process of rethinking consent” 
(2012) 3 Crim LR 118. 
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modification procedures, outside of piercing and tattooing, are unlawful to perform when 
they result in bodily harm.   
This article reviews that decision in light of the prevailing case law and asks if this area of 
the law has now been clarified, or whether body modification practitioners continue to 
operate in a legal grey area. It also considers whether self-regulation by the body 
modification industry could answer the concerns expressed by the Court of Appeal in BM 
and how the law could adapt to accommodate these procedures.   
 
Consent and the public interest 
Whether an individual should be immunised from the criminal law of offences against the 
person when consent had been given to an application of force has been a thorny issue 
for the law. The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA), upon which we still rely 
when non-fatal bodily injury is caused, is silent on consent – leaving the common law to 
develop the necessary principles. The courts have consequently adopted a paternalistic 
approach, demonstrating a willingness to restrict personal autonomy in the interests of 
public policy and confirming that a person does not have the right to deal with his or her 
body entirely as they choose – the courts will draw a line where the public interest requires.  
Consequently, the common law has established that an assault or a battery can be 
effectively consented to, but when bodily harm is intentionally inflicted an offence at ss.47, 
20 or 18 OAPA 1861 will be committed regardless of whether consent has been given – 
unless injury has been caused in the course of an activity exempted from this general 
rule.10  
 
Brown and the general statement of public policy 
The limits on the validity of consent when non-fatal offences against the person are in 
question continues to be governed by the ever-contentious opinions of the majority (Lords 
Templeman, Jauncey and Lowry; Lords Mustill and Slynn dissenting) in the case of Brown. 
In Brown, a group of male sadomasochists had intentionally and consensually inflicted 
physical injuries upon one another for their mutual sexual pleasure and, having been 
convicted of offences contrary to ss.47 and 20 OAPA 1861, the men appealed. Their 
convictions were upheld by the Court of Appeal and, in answer to an appeal asking whether 
“the prosecution have to prove lack of consent on the part of B before they can establish 
                                                             
10 For a review of the development of this general principle see M. Giles, “R v Brown: Consensual Harm and the 
Public Interest” (1994) 57(1) MLR 101.  
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A’s guilt under section 20 and section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act”, the 
majority of the House of Lords answered in the negative. Affirming Lord Lane CJ’s dictum 
in Attorney-General's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) that 
“it is not in the public interest that people should try to cause, or should cause, 
each other actual bodily harm for no good reason. Minor struggles are another 
matter. So, in our judgment, it is immaterial whether the act occurs in private or 
in public; it is an assault if actual bodily harm is intended and/or caused.” 11  
As Ormerod and Laird have indicated, this statement of the law should now be considered 
as “overbroad” as it no longer correctly represents the approach taken in subsequent cases 
when bodily harm has not been foreseen, nor is it foreseeable.12 However, when bodily 
harm is intended and caused, Lord Lane CJ’s dictum is still authoritative.  
 
Category-based exceptions 
A corollary to this was the acknowledgment by Lord Lane CJ that actual bodily harm may 
be caused for a good reason. Thus, when harm is caused during a legitimate activity, 
liability may be negated by express or implied consent. His Lordship stated that these 
exempted activities include 
“properly conducted games and sports, lawful chastisement or correction, 
reasonable surgical interference, dangerous exhibitions, etc. These apparent 
exceptions can be justified as involving the exercise of a legal right, in the case of 
chastisement or correction, or as needed in the public interest, in the other cases.” 
13  
As the Law Commission noted in its Consultation Paper Consent in the Criminal Law, this 
portion of the judgment is “merely a summary” of the position of the law which “does not 
set out at all the specific conditions for the legality of the various types of conduct referred 
to; and it does not purport to be exhaustive.”14 Indeed other activities have been added 
to this ‘list’ of exceptions. In Jones the Court of Appeal accepted that rough and 
undisciplined horseplay was an exceptional category.15 This protection was extended to 
“robust games” in Aitken where it was held that injuries sustained in the course of a prank 
                                                             
11 [1981] QB 715 (CA) 719.  
12 D. Ormerod and K. Laird, Smith, Hogan, & Ormerod's Criminal Law, 15th edition (OUP: Oxford, 2018) 676-
677. 
13 Attorney-General's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715 (CA) at 719 (Lord Lane CJ). 
14 Law Commission of England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law Consultation Paper No.139 (HMSO 
1995) at para 9.4.  
15 (1986) 83 Cr App R 375 (CA). 
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could fall under the exception.16 In Brown the majority of the Court held that there was 
no justification for allowing sado-masochistic activities to be legitimised but recognised 
that the defence of consent could be extended to other lawful activities, with Lords Slynn 
and Templeman identifying tattooing and ear-piercing as procedures which are lawfully 
performed. Lord Mustill added that religious flagellation was also exempted from the 
general rule.17 
These exceptions are created on an ad hoc basis and there are no clear legal principles 
expounded in Brown that can be used to explain why certain activities are exempted from 
the general rule, or which activities may be excused in the future. As Lord Woolf CJ has 
pragmatically stated in Barnes “the rule and the exceptions to the rule that a person cannot 
consent to his being caused actual harm, are based on public policy.”18   
Recognising category-based exceptions to the general rule allows the law to shift in 
response to social change. Acts resulting in bodily harm may fall under an existing 
exception or, when faced with a new situation, a court may decide to create a new 
exception – taking into consideration whether there is any good reason - more specifically 
any public interest - in allowing that activity to continue. Unfortunately, this approach 
offers little clarity for those who are engaged in activities that are neither wholly analogous 
to accepted practices or those that sit on the boundaries of public acceptability, as the 
appellants in Brown found to their considerable cost. It also means that the presumption 
of illegality may be difficult to displace when the activity in question is a subcultural one.  
Body modifications fall on this boundary. In the absence of any lawful justification a 
modifier causing bodily harm to his or her client will be committing an offence. Thus, 
procedures including scarification, branding, tongue splitting, and ear pointing must fall to 
be decided on a case by case basis.  
The legal grey area that these body modifications have occupied had not gone unnoticed 
prior to the decision in M. In its 1995 Consultation Paper Consent in the Criminal Law the 
Law Commission had pointed to the lack of statutory regulation for procedures such as 
scarification and branding which had left this area of the law unclear.19 However, the 
concerns expressed by the Law Commission were not addressed by the legislature and the 
case of BM has been the first opportunity the courts have had to consider the lawfulness 
of these procedures.  
 
                                                             
16 [1992] 1 WLR 1006 (CMAC). 
17 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 (HL) at 231 and 267.  
18  [2004] EWCA Crim 3246, [2005] 1 WLR 910 at [9].  
19 Law Commission of England and Wales Consent in the Criminal Law at paras 9.7-9.29.  
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R v BM 
In BM, the procedures in question had been consensually performed by a body modification 
practitioner for aesthetic purposes and had resulted in permanent and irreversible 
alterations to the bodies of those clients who had requested them. The appellant was 
registered with his local authority for the purposes of piercing and tattooing and held no 
medical qualifications. He had performed several modification procedures at his business 
premises and had been charged with three counts of wounding with intent to do grievous 
bodily harm contrary to s.18 of the OAPA 1861 and three alternative counts of inflicting 
grievous bodily harm contrary to s.20. The charges related to procedures performed on 
three separate individuals; a tongue splitting, the removal of an ear and the removal of a 
(male) client’s nipple. At a preliminary hearing his Honour Judge Nawaz ruled that consent 
was not available as a defence to the offences charged. The appellant then took the 
unusual step of making an interlocutory application under s.35(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 against the ruling that consent provided no 
defence.   
The application heard by the Court of Appeal concerned the straightforward question of 
whether consent could provide a defence to the charges the defendant faced. There was 
no dispute regarding the reality of the consent given to the appellant by his clients; the 
appellant had obtained consent, it was voluntary and informed; and he had not exceeded 
that consent.   
Counsel for the appellant accepted the binding authority of Brown but suggested that it 
could be distinguished as the facts at hand did not concern sado-masochistic activities, 
but rather, body modifications which do not seek to breed or glorify cruelty. Nor, he 
suggested, should the procedures be construed as medical or surgical; they were solely 
for the purposes of bodily adornment. The appellant relied heavily on the dictum of Lord 
Lane CJ in Attorney-General's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) submitting that there was a good 
reason for the infliction of harm in body modification procedures. As these modifications 
were undertaken for personal enhancement the Court, he argued, should give weight to 
personal autonomy and recognise an individual’s right to adapt their own appearance. 
Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, argued that, as serious harm had been 
caused, the person injured simply could not consent in law as the conduct did not fall 
within one of the recognised exceptions. He described the procedures as essentially 
medical, as akin to cosmetic surgery and performed without any medical justification. He 
pointed out that while reasonable surgical interference is exempted from the general rule 
the assumption is that this is performed by those who are medically qualified and subject 
to regulation by the relevant governing bodies. Moreover, body modifications should not 
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be added to the list of recognised exceptions as public health considerations should prevail 
over personal autonomy in these circumstances.  
Providing the judgment of the Court the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Burnett, dismissed the 
appeal taking the view that these procedures were medical in nature, had been undertaken 
by an individual who was not medically trained and had been performed for no good 
medical reason. Clients requesting these procedures may, suggested his Lordship, be 
mentally ill and modifiers are not equipped to make judgements about the mental state of 
their clients.  
Lord Burnett CJ recognised that tattooing and piercing enjoys immunity from the criminal 
law as society has “long accepted tattooing and piercing (not just of ears) as acceptable.”20 
However the Court was unwilling to accept that these body modification procedures were 
analogous to any recognised exception, nor was the Court willing to recognise a new 
category-based exception to the general rule that would accommodate body modifications. 
His Lordship acknowledged that there was “no easily articulated principle by which any 
novel situation may be judged”21 but that activities were exempted from the general rule 
on the grounds they conferred some “discernible social benefit” or it would be 
unreasonable to criminalise the activity if it were consented to.22 Body modifications were 
held to have neither of these features and Lord Burnett CJ concluded:  
“In short, we can see no good reason why body modification should be placed in a 
special category of exemption from the general rule that the consent of an 
individual to injury provides no defence to the person who inflicts that injury if the 
violence causes actual bodily harm or more serious injury.”23 
The Court further noted that a change in the law was a matter for Parliament.24   
The terminology of ‘body modification’ was used throughout the judgment as a catch-all 
for the procedures the appellant had performed and, as the Court noted, “many more” 
procedures25 – although, problematically, the Court gave no clear indication of what other 
procedures they were bringing under this broad umbrella.  
 
 
                                                             
20 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [44].  
21 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [38]. 
22 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [40]. 
23 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [45]. 
24 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [45]. 
25 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [8]. 
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“A natural extension of tattooing and piercing” 
In BM there were two lines of argument the appellant could have realistically pursued to 
exempt the procedures from criminal liability; either (i) that body modifications fell within 
an established exception and were thus lawful, or (ii) that body modification should be 
recognised as a wholly new exception to which consent could negate liability.  
The argument that body modifications fall within the established category-based 
exceptions of tattooing or ear-piercing is a tenuous one. Branding had previously been 
generously interpreted as akin to tattooing and thus lawful by the Court of Appeal in the 
case of Wilson (below).26 Despite this judicial blip it was never likely that the Court would 
accept that the procedures undertaken in BM were akin to either tattooing or piercing, and 
the appellant did not attempt to suggest that they were analogous. Instead, counsel for 
the appellant sought to convince the Court that the procedures conducted should be 
accepted as a “natural extension of tattooing and piercing”;27 essentially that these 
procedures were merely contemporary forms of bodily adornment undertaken to enhance 
an individual’s physical appearance.  
This is not, however, an argument without merit. Many of the recognised exceptional 
categories provide a description of a ‘type’ of activity that will be immunised from the 
general rule. For example, new sports such as bossaball and kiteboarding undoubtedly 
enjoy immunity under the generic exemption of “properly conducted games and sports.” 
Likewise, “dangerous exhibitions” establishes a category into which knife throwing or fire 
eating demonstrations may fall.28 It could then be surmised that the terms “tattooing” and 
“ear-piercing” were merely being used by their Lordships in Brown as contemporary 
examples of bodily adornment and other modifications may fall within this exception. This 
is not without precedent. For example, despite the lack of direct authority on this point 
bodily piercing has long been accepted as lawful wounding, 29 (the Law Lords in Brown 
spoke only of the lawfulness of ear-piercing) and the caveat of ‘ear’ was dropped by Lord 
Burnett CJ in his discussion of the lawfulness of piercing in BM.30  
However, when body modification procedures other than ear-piercing and tattooing have 
been treated as lawful this has only been where there has been some similarity between 
the procedure and the practices of tattooing and ear-piercing. It is difficult to draw any 
                                                             
26 [1997] QB 47 (CA). 
27 R v Wilson [1997] QB 47 (CA) at [34]. 
28 There is no case law in this area, so we are left to guess what may be included within this category. 
29 Body piercing was accepted as lawful in the first instance decision of Oversby unless the act of piercing is 
performed for sexual pleasure. (Unreported) December 1990, cited in the Law Commission of England and 
Wales Consent in the Criminal Law at para 9.7. 
30 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [39]. 
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equivalence in either process or result between those procedures that had been performed 
in M - tongue splitting and the removal of body parts – and the modification procedures 
the law has, to date, seen fit to legitimise. As Lord Burnett CJ explained in BM, there is a 
distinction between procedures which seek to enhance or adorn the body and those which 
involve the removal or mutilation of a body part and amount to really serious harm. There 
was no “proper analogy” 31 in law between tattooing and piercing and these practices.  
The second exceptional category under which body modifications could fall is that of 
“reasonable surgical interference”. As a category “reasonable surgical interference” has 
attracted little academic or judicial attention. In fact, as Lord Mustill recognised in Brown, 
“proper medical treatment” may be subject to special rules that take it outside of the 
defence of consent.32 In BM Lord Burnett CJ accepted the argument advanced by the 
respondent that body modification procedures were essentially surgical in nature, stating 
that there was an “implication that elective surgery would only be reasonable if carried 
out by someone qualified to perform it.” 33 Consequently, the procedures could not be 
immunised from the criminal law when performed by unqualified practitioners who were 
not subject to professional oversight, as in BM.34  
Lord Burnett CJ’s comments in BM on surgical procedures being lawful only when 
undertaken by those qualified to perform them are perhaps weakened by a regime that 
permits non-therapeutic male circumcision.35 Ritual circumcision, as a religious or cultural 
rite of initiation, can be performed by medically qualified and non-medically qualified 
practitioners alike, yet this practice continues to enjoy immunity from the criminal law. In 
light of BM it may become difficult to defend this unconditional exception; male 
circumcision may not amount to bodily mutilation,36 but it certainly requires the removal 
of part of the body. There is a system of oversight for Jewish male circumcision, which is 
administered by the Initiation Society of Great Britain who train and supervise Mohelim. If 
such self-regulation is used to justify (at least in part) the toleration of ritual male 
                                                             
31 BM 2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [42]. 
32 Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212 (HL) at 266. Also see the comments of Lord Mustill in Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland [1993] A.C. 789 at 891. 
33 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [42]. This was essentially recognition of the fact that here we are looking for 
proper medical treatment.  
34 For further discussion of this point see K. Laird “Defence: R. v BM” Crim LR (2018) 10, 847-850. 
35 Addressed in Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Muslim upbringing and circumcision) [2000] 1 F.L.R. 571 and in Re B 
and G (children) (care proceedings) [2015] 1 WLUK 163. 
36The Law Commission accepted that male circumcision was not a mutilation although its reasoning on this 
point may be, as Gilbert has asserted, questionable.  Law Commission Consultation Paper No.139, Criminal 
Law, Consent in the Criminal Law (1995) at para 9.2. H. Gilbert ‘Time to reconsider the lawfulness of 
ritual male circumcision’ E.H.R.L.R. (2007) 3, 279-294. 
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circumcision when performed by individuals who are not medically qualified, then 
consideration should be given to whether body modifications could be similarly regulated.   
 
 
 
Creation of a new exception 
The rejection of body modifications as contemporary forms of tattooing or piercing and 
the recognition that this was not “proper medical treatment” left the Court to address 
whether these procedures were deserving of protection through the creation of a new 
exception. Here, the Court was not only looking at the seriousness of the harm caused, 
but whether more extreme procedures could be exempted for a “good reason”, or, as Lord 
Burnett CJ set out, allowing the continuation of the activity conferred some “social 
benefit”37 or it would be unreasonable to criminalise it.38 
Asking whether it is unreasonable to disallow consent suggests an approach akin to that 
adopted in Wilson (below) where lawfulness is assumed unless that presumption can be 
displaced in the public interest. However, Lord Burnett CJ was not sanctioning such a 
radical shift in approach, he was merely seeking to extract general principles to explain 
why certain activities have been exempted from the general rule.39 This said, his Lordship’s 
discussion of “social benefit” and “unreasonableness” may usefully loosen the shackles on 
the use of “good reason” as the prime justification for legitimising an activity. 
 
Social Benefit and Unreasonableness  
In BM, the appellant had submitted that to disallow consent would unnecessarily limit 
personal autonomy as clients who wished to have body modification procedures performed 
would have that choice unreasonably curtailed by the criminal law. This reasoning was 
roundly rejected by Lord Burnett CJ who took a resolutely paternalistic approach.  
Significant weight was given to the evidence submitted by an ear, nose and throat 
consultant and, a consultant plastic surgeon regarding the nature of the procedures before 
the Court. This expert evidence, described as “uncontroversial”40 and summarised at the 
                                                             
37 This seems to be nothing more than a synonym for “public interest”.  
38 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [40]. 
39 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [40]. 
40 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [12]. 
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beginning of the judgment, established that the ear, nipple and tongue modifications would 
not be performed by medical professionals for purely aesthetic purposes and posed a 
significant risk of complications, of infection and – in the case of the ear removal – of 
hearing loss.41 Lord Burnett CJ later noted that society deserves to be protected from the 
“risk of unwanted injury, disease or even death” which may flow from the consensual 
infliction of serious injury and “may impose on society as a whole substantial cost.”42 Here, 
Lord Burnett CJ appears to have been influenced by the expert evidence, viewing body 
modifications as posing a serious danger to physical health and echoing the speculative 
rhetoric of their Lordships in Brown, where the potential for serious harm was as relevant 
to the Courts estimation of the dangerousness of sado-masochism as the resultant harm.43  
Speaking of the appellants working environment his Lordship recognised that the appellant 
had taken “some trouble to ensure a sterile environment when he operated” and conceded 
that “his work was in some respects tidy and clean” but emphasised that this was 
immaterial as “consent as a defence could not turn on the quality of the work then 
performed.”44 In light of the physical dangers posed his Lordship rejected the proposition 
that body modifications could be “placed in a special category of exemption” emphasising 
that there was a need to protect society from needless violence.45  
Despite these concerns no consideration was given to the dangers that might flow were 
modification procedures carried out other than on licensed premises. As noted, tattooists 
and piercers are required to submit to regulation and monitoring to ensure that the 
requisite standards of hygiene and safety are maintained, and procedures performed in 
these premises benefit from this licensing regime. The Law Commission, considering this 
issue in its 1995 Consultation Paper, noted that the respondents to that consultation had 
warned that if procedures were to take place otherwise than in licenced premises they 
may be performed in unhygienic conditions, that inappropriate and dangerous equipment 
may be used and there would, resultantly, be a risk of HIV infection.46 If the Court in M 
was seeking to protect putative victims of body modifications from injury, disease and 
death then declaring that these practices unlawful is likely to do little other than, as those 
same respondents to the Law Commission had advised, drive these practices underground. 
The physical dangers that so occupied the Court could perhaps be more effectively 
countered by following those models established for tattooing and piercing, where local 
governance provide a framework within which practitioners effectively self-regulate.  
                                                             
41 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [13]-[20]. 
42 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [39]. 
43 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 (HL) at 246 and 254. 
44 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [42]. 
45 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [45]. 
46 Law Commission of England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law at para 9.21. 
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Another key consideration for the court was that individuals who were vulnerable or 
mentally ill were particularly deserving of protection from the repercussions of body 
modifications as it was felt they may consent to procedures that risked life-long 
consequences. Characterising body modification procedures as surgical procedures also 
led Lord Burnett CJ to an a priori assumption that additional safeguards - not available to 
the clients of body modifiers - 47 should be in place to protect those seeking out body 
modifications as  
“a cosmetic surgeon would be on the look out for potential psychiatric or 
psychological problems and, if necessary, refer the patient for an assessment. The 
General Medical Council has also introduced rules which require a two week cooling 
off period before surgery is performed to enable a patient to change his or her 
mind.” 48 
As part of pre-operative assessment, surgeons undertaking cosmetic procedures may 
require patients to undergo a psychological assessment to identify conditions such as body 
dysmorphic disorder49 but, as the Court recognised, a psychiatric assessment is not 
mandated for all cosmetic procedures.50 Adults who are mentally ill are also free to have 
tattoos and piercings without inquiries being made into their state of mind, however ill-
advised those procedures may be. Many people may question the wisdom of having a large 
facial tattoo but, if a customer requests such, a tattooist is not obliged to refer that client 
for psychological assessment. There is no sound rationale for protecting individuals from 
the harm a tongue split may cause when the law tolerates the lawful application of a facial 
tattoo which poses a risk of not only physical harm, but social stigma.   
Several references were made to mental illness in this relatively short decision.51 In one 
portion, the Court appeared to equate the desire to undergo body modification procedures 
with – at least in some incidences - mental illness. As Lord Burnett CJ explained: 
“The fact that a desire to have an ear or nipple removed or tongue split is 
incomprehensible to most, may not be sufficient in itself to raise the question 
whether those who seek to do so might be in need of a mental health assessment. 
Yet the first response in almost every other context to those who seek to harm 
                                                             
47 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [42]. 
48 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [13]. 
49 Royal College of Surgeons Professional Standards for Cosmetic Surgery (April, 2016). Available at: 
www.rcseng.ac.uk/-/media/files/rcs/standards-and-research/standards-and-policy/service-
standards/cosmetic-surgery/professional-standards-for-cosmetic-surgery-web.pdf (accessed 1 September 
2018). See T. Elliott for a discussion of psychological assessments and the reality of consent in ‘Body 
dysmorphic disorder, radical surgery and the limits of consent’ (2009) MLR, Volume 17, Issue 2, Summer, 149. 
50 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [13] and [20]. 
51 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [8], [39] and [43].   
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themselves would be to suggest medical assistance. That is not to say that all who 
seek body modification are suffering from any identifiable mental illness but it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that some will be, and that within the cohort will be 
many who are vulnerable.” 52 
Two objections can be made to this line of reasoning. First, his Lordship assumes that 
those seeking body modifications are looking to “harm themselves”. This reasoning 
axiomatically distances body modification procedures from piercing and tattooing – 
procedures which are viewed, in law, as decorative rather than intrinsically harmful. On 
the face of it this is an odd distinction to make; tattoos and piercings cause bodily harm 
and are no more medically warranted than a tongue split or a nipple removal. The real 
crux of the Courts argument was that these modification procedures would be 
“incomprehensible to most” – that there were no strong public policy arguments for 
exempting them from the general rule.  
Yet, there was no real consideration by Lord Burnett CJ of how prevalent or well-practised 
body modification procedures are; the Court took for granted that these were marginal 
activities. When Brown was decided body piercing was considered a subcultural practice, 
yet in 2008 Bone et al put the prevalence of body piercing at 10 per cent of the population. 
More specifically the proportion of 16 to 24-year-olds with a tongue piercing was 6.5 per 
cent and a lip piercing 2.7 per cent and it is likely these percentages have now increased.53 
It is of course difficult to say how widespread more extreme body modifications are in the 
current population, many modifications will be hidden from public view and there are no 
figures on their prevalence in England and Wales. It is reasonable to assume that modifiers 
offer these services as there is a market for them, and that they are more widespread 
than the Court had appreciated.  
Secondly – and of more importance in any legal analysis - Lord Burnett CJ appeared to be 
putting the cart before the horse in his examination of capacity. The ability to give valid 
consent should not be a decisive matter in any consideration of whether an activity should 
be exempted from the general rule. Instead it should go to the quite separate question of 
whether a particular individual, on a particular day has the capacity to give consent. Mental 
illness may mean that an individual is not capable of giving valid consent, and their 
professed consent would not then negate liability. Inferring that those who seek out bodily 
modifications may be mentally ill is, however, not a sound rationale on which to exclude 
modifications from the class of activities to which one may consent. The law does not 
typically take such a broad-brush approach to limiting autonomy. Activities have not 
                                                             
52 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [43].  
53 A. Bone, F. Ncube, T Nichols, N. D. Noah, ‘Body piercing in England: a survey of piercing at sites other than 
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previously been excluded on the basis that, if we do not exclude them, then those who 
are mentally ill or otherwise vulnerable may participate in that activity. Dangerous sports 
and cosmetic surgery are activities that those who are mentally ill and/or vulnerable can 
engage in to their physical detriment, but we trust that their governing bodies will self-
regulate.  
 
The Problem of Wilson  
As the above has illustrated, personal autonomy was given little weight in the judgment. 
Yet the law allows individuals to consent to potentially fatal injuries while boxing,54 to the 
reckless transmission of serious sexual diseases,55 to gender reassignment surgery and to 
the refusal of potentially lifesaving treatment. The pivotal role autonomy plays in our 
modern legal system – and this includes protection from unwarranted interference by the 
state – necessitates careful justification for constraining personal autonomy, yet Lord 
Burnett CJ’s only reference to autonomy in BM was to state that consent did “not provide 
the appellant with a justification for removing body modification from the ambit of the law 
of assault.”56 A very different approach was taken in Wilson where consent was used to 
negate liability for a body modification procedure.  
Wilson is typically cited as a case which presented a retreat from the harsh authority of 
Brown.57 In Wilson,58 Mrs Wilson had asked her husband to brand her buttocks with his 
initials for decoration and, using a hot knife, Mr Wilson had branded a capital letter ‘A’ on 
one buttock and a ‘W’ on the other. Convicted of actual bodily harm, contrary to s.47, Mr 
Wilson appealed to the Court of Appeal claiming that the trial judge had incorrectly 
considered himself bound by the dictum in Donovan that a criminal act cannot “be 
rendered lawful because the person to whose detriment it is done consents to it”59 and 
had directed the jury to convict as there could be no lawful consent to the branding.   
In Wilson the Court, led by Russell LJ, quashed the conviction stating that the injuries 
which had resulted from a practice (branding) that is no “more dangerous or painful than 
tattooing”60 should not be matter for criminal prosecution. Distinguishing Brown and 
                                                             
54 R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534 and Law Commission of England and Wales, Consent and Offences Against the 
Person, Consultation Paper No.134 (HMSO 1994) at para 10.21. 
55  R v Dica [2004] QB 1257. 
56 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [44]. 
57 See D. W. Selfe, “Consent to harm: a retreat from Brown?” (1996) 65 Crim. Law 10; P. Roberts, “Consent to 
injury: how far can you go?” (1997) 113 LQR 27; P. Murphy, “Flogging live complainants and dead horses: we 
may no longer need to be in bondage to Brown” (2011) 10 Crim LR 758.  
58 R v Wilson [1997] QB 47 (CA). 
59 [1934] 2 KB 498 at 507. 
60 R v Wilson [1997] QB 47 (CA) at 50. 
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Donovan Russell LJ explained that consensual branding was lawful when the brand was 
applied with no aggressive intent and that the application of a brand was “no less 
understandable than the piercing of nostrils or even tongues for the purposes of inserting 
decorative jewellery”61 - a clear nod to the shift in cultural norms which had seen more 
extreme forms of piercing become mainstream. Turning the general rule on its head the 
Court approached the injury as lawful unless “public policy or the public interest” required 
that it should be criminal.62 Accepting that Mrs Wilson had instigated the application of the 
brand and that her husband had not sought to injure his wife, Russell LJ ruled that the 
appellant was merely seeking to assist Mrs Wilson “in what she regarded as the acquisition 
of a desirable piece of personal adornment.”63  
Ostensibly, Wilson is barely distinguishable from BM. In both cases the putative victims 
had instigated procedures that were neither sexual nor violent, and the appellants had 
sought to assist in “the acquisition of a desirable piece of personal adornment.” The injuries 
in BM may have been of a more significant degree than those suffered in Wilson, but this 
is a fine distinction. The injury incurred by Mrs Wilson was irreversible and she had – unlike 
the clients in BM - sought medical treatment.  
The decision in Wilson was however couched in terms that suggest the decision of the 
Court had rested heavily upon the context, with Russell LJ stating: 
“Consensual activity between husband and wife, in the privacy of the matrimonial   home, 
is not, in our judgement, normally a proper matter for criminal investigation, let alone 
criminal prosecution.” 64 
It is suggested here that this is clearly obiter; in reaching its decision the Court of Appeal 
had focused on the similarity between tattooing and branding, both of which result in a 
patterning of the skin. It is here that the similarities between Wilson and BM fall away. 
The procedures in BM were more invasive than the application of the brand in Wilson and, 
as discussed, there is no equivalence in either process or result between, for example, 
tongue splitting and the lawful forms of personal adornment.  
Moreover, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Wilson simply cannot be readily 
reconciled with the majority of the House of Lords in Brown. By favouring a presumption 
of legality in Wilson, the Court were able to give effect to the minority position in Brown. 
Yet, whether an injury is inflicted in public or private (or between those who are married) 
is irrelevant, nor should a laudable motive excuse the infliction of harm if harm was the 
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appellant’s intent. For these reasons, the reasoning in Wilson is widely acknowledged as 
pragmatic but muddled65 – it was certainly given short shrift in BM where it was only briefly 
mentioned “for completeness”.66  
M now certainly casts doubt on whether branding is lawful at all – whether practised 
“between husband and wife, in the privacy of the matrimonial home” or – a point not 
explored in Wilson - between a body modification practitioner and their client. The decision 
in Wilson must now be thrown into doubt by BM or, at least, restricted to its very particular 
facts. 
 
 
 
 
Self-regulation 
If the criminal courts are, as Lord Burnett CJ declared, “inapt to enable a wide-ranging 
inquiry into the underlying policy issues”67 – and it is likely that this position will only be 
exacerbated as body modification procedures evolve – could self-regulation by modifiers 
then provide a more effective solution to effective regulation? In BM the Court did not 
explore whether a considered attempt at self-regulation by the body modification industry 
would ameliorate their concerns.   
As noted, extreme body modification procedures currently fall outside of the regulatory 
regime which has been established to ensure piercing and tattooing is carried out safely. 
However, modifiers could adopt a similar – enhanced – regime to protect their clients. In 
order to reduce any serious risks to health, modifiers could be required to be licensed as 
tattooists and/or piercers and obliged to ensure that they maintained the requisite 
standards of safety and hygiene. In recognition of the seriousness of these procedures 
practitioners could adopt a similar regime to that instituted by the General Medical Council 
by making fuller assessments of their clients,68 looking for known signs of body dysmorphic 
disorder and mandating a two-week cooling off period after an initial consultation. Clients 
                                                             
65 For example, see comments by P. Roberts, “Consent to injury: how far can you go?” (1997) 113 LQ R 27 and 
D. Gurnham, “Legal authority and savagery in judicial rhetoric: sexual violence and the criminal courts” (2011) 
7(2) Int JLC 117. 
66 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [33].  
67 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [41].  
 
68 The Court noted that M had obtained consent and required clients declare whether they suffered from 
particular diseases or were taking medication. BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [9]. 
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could be referred to experts in particular modification procedures if a database, similar to 
that maintained by of the British Association of Aesthetic Plastic Surgeons, were 
established. Enforcing this regime would, of course, necessitate the creation of a 
regulatory body to train and oversee body modifiers and enforce these standards. Piercers 
and tattooists have already sought to establish their own standards by founding the Tattoo 
and Piercing Industry Union69 and this model could then be effectively utilised by body 
modifiers. Drafting this code of conduct would present an opportunity for views to be 
canvassed on which procedures are contemporarily reasonable, safe to perform and should 
attract regulation – an issue the Court of Appeal was not prepared to engage with. Self-
regulation would go some way toward addressing the concerns expressed by the Court in 
BM who appear to have viewed body modifications as a rogue industry.  
If a model of responsible regulation had been in place when the Court of Appeal was 
reaching its decision in BM a willingness to self-regulate may have weighed in the 
appellant’s favour. Those who make money from activities which carry real levels of risk 
do typically take measures toward self-regulation and are left unmolested by the criminal 
law. Therapeutic acupuncture is not regulated by statute (nor is it explicitly mentioned in 
common law as an exempted activity) and, although there are then no nationally agreed 
standards, the industry self-regulates through its own codes of practice.70 National sports 
governing bodies also provide their own procedures for enforcing standards and discipling 
those who breach their rules. For example, World Rugby and the Football Association 
establish and enforce rules that seek to protect participants within the game from injury 
and as Lord Woolf stated in Barnes 
“most organised sports have their own disciplinary procedures for enforcing their 
particular rules and standards of conduct. As a result, in the majority of situations 
there is not only no need for criminal proceedings, it is undesirable that there 
should be any criminal proceedings.”71  
Lord Woolf concluded that only where “conduct is sufficiently grave to be properly 
categorised as criminal” should a prosecution be initiated72 - a position which echoed the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Wilson. If the Court in BM had been willing to 
                                                             
69 Tattooing and Piercing Industry Union http://www.tpiu.org.uk/ (accessed 31 January 2019) 
70 British Acupuncture Council Professional Codes available at https://www.acupuncture.org.uk/public-
content/effective-practice/bacc-professional-codes.html (accessed 27 February 2019) 
71 R v Barnes (Mark) [2005] 1 W.L.R. 910 at 911. 
72 R v Barnes (Mark) [2005] 1 W.L.R. 910 at 911. The Barnes principle has since been formalised by the CPS, see 
the Crown Prosecution Service ‘Agreement on the Handling of incidents falling under both criminal and 
football regulatory jurisdiction’ (September 2015). Available at 
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regulatory (accessed 8 February 2018). For further discussion of the Agreement see B. Livings ‘Sports violence, 
"concurrent jurisdiction" and the decision to bring a criminal prosecution’ Crim. L.R. 2018, 6, 430-449. 
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countenance this approach a prosecution could still be brought where modifiers had failed 
to adhere to their established code of conduct or had exceeded the limits of consent.    
 
 
The Future for Body Modifications  
In BM the Court of Appeal has then rejected a defence of consent to body modifications 
that cause bodily injury. There are three guiding principles we can extract from Lord 
Burnett CJ’s reasoning.    
First, decorative body modification procedures that result in bodily harm, and are not 
performed by a medical practitioner, are unlawful. Although the Court infers that the status 
of the person performing the modification is central to whether its application is lawful as 
Laird has pointed out it is also by no means clear that these procedures would be lawful 
had they been performed by a medical professional as: 
“Even though the surgeon may have been qualified to perform the procedure, the 
Court of Appeal’s reasoning does not reveal whether the patient’s consent would 
be valid or whether such "body modification", by its very nature, cannot be 
consented to in the absence of legislative intervention.”73 
The Courts focus on an individual who was not qualified to perform surgical procedures 
allowed them to effectively side-step any further consideration of this issue.  
Secondly, the Court confirmed that body modification procedures with a close analogy to 
tattooing and piercing may be exempted from the general rule that when bodily harm is 
intentionally inflicted an offence against the person will be committed regardless of 
whether consent has been given.  However, we are left to guess what these procedures 
may be. In Wilson, Russell LJ had certainly seen a close analogy between branding and 
tattooing, but this equivalence is questionable. Scarification provides a similar aesthetic 
result to tattooing – a pattern in the skin – but was held to be unlawful in the pre-Brown 
and Wilson first instance case of Adesanya.74  
Branding and scarification may fall within the established tattooing exception if we are 
required to look to whether the result is merely analogous to tattooing.75 This is an 
                                                             
73 K. Laird “Defence: R. v BM” Crim LR (2018) 10, 847-850. 
74 Where a mother was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm for performing an act of – 
culturally motivated - scarification on the faces of her two sons. R v Adesanya The Times, 16-17 July 1974. 
75 Oultram makes an interesting argument – pre-M (B) – for scarification to be treated as akin to tattooing. S. 
Oultram, “All hail the new flesh” (2009) 35(10) Journal of Medical Ethics. Finding this practice lawful if 
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altogether unsatisfactory way of delineating the lawfulness of these procedures and raises 
the issue – which will not be addressed here – of whether the law is inconsistent with the 
requirement of certainty in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).76 
In light of the above, it is worth noting that had the modifications in M been undertaken 
purely for religious adherence, the Court would have had to consider whether they could 
be exempted by virtue of Article 9 of the ECHR, the right to religious freedom. While we 
would expect body modifications to be accommodated if there were some religious 
justification - similar to the religious flagellation exception noted in Brown77  – there is no 
direct authority on this point. In M, Lord Burnett CJ conceded that it may be unreasonable 
to criminalise activities resulting in  harm that have a “religious hue”.78  
Finally, it appears the courts are now less willing to take the bold step of creating new 
exceptions to the Brown approach. In Wilson and Attorney-General's Reference (No. 6 of 
1980) the Court of Appeal had advocated the recognition of new exceptions as required in 
the public interest. Lord Burnett CJ has now moved the court away from this position, 
stating that it was inappropriate to recognise a new exception 
“save perhaps where there is a close analogy with an existing exception to the 
general rule established in the Brown case. The recognition of an entirely new 
exception would involve a value judgement which is policy laden, and on which 
there may be powerful conflicting views in society. The criminal trial process is inapt 
to enable a wide-ranging inquiry into the underlying policy issues, which are much 
better explored in the political environment.”79 
In Brown, Lord Templeman had similarly advocated leaving the question of whether 
consent should be available to Parliament who could “…call on the advice of doctors, 
psychiatrists, criminologists, sociologists and other experts and can also sound and take 
into account public opinion.”80 His Lordship had not however ruled out the possibility of 
creating new exceptions. Lord Burnett CJ has now considerably narrowed this approach 
                                                             
performed for cultural reasons would cause more ambiguity in the law as other cultural practices such as tooth 
filing, and neck stretching are unlikely to be similarly immunised from the criminal law.  
76 Other human rights issues are raised by the decision in M (B), not least the right to respect for private and 
family life. These were glossed over in the judgment – Lord Burnett CJ merely noted the appeal by the 
appellants in Brown to the ECtHR where a violation of the right to respect for private life had been rejected on 
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health. See Laskey, Jaggard, and Brown v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 39 (ECtHR) at [44].  
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between the specific act of flagellation and the more general practice of mortification these terms are being 
used interchangeably. See Law Commission of England and Wales Consent in the Criminal Law, above n.14. 
78 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [40].  
79 BM [2018] 3 W.L.R. 883 at [40]. 
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and, moving forward, it seems that the apparent non-exhaustive ‘list’81 of exceptions are 
now to be treated as finite. 
The judgment in BM also leaves a number of questions unanswered. The Court was tasked 
with addressing whether consent provided a defence against charges of causing grievous 
bodily harm with intent, yet it gave no indication that it was restricting its comments solely 
to procedures intended to cause serious harm. Due to the nature of the procedures 
performed by the appellant the court’s discussion was necessarily focussed on injuries 
which were serious and irreversible, those which involved the removal or mutilation of 
body parts82 and, in light of that analysis, it is unsurprising Lord Burnett CJ concluded 
“body modification causes really serious harm”.83 However, this is a sweeping 
generalisation which does not take into account that several popular modification 
procedures - including transdermal and subdermal implants, scarification and branding – 
may result in less serious harm. Are these procedures then unlawful to perform even with 
client consent?  
The severity and irreversibility of the injuries in BM may have prompted the decision to 
prosecute, but the majority of the House in Brown drew no distinction between how the 
defence of consent operates for injuries which amount to actual bodily harm and those 
which amount to grievous bodily harm, relying instead on the category-based exceptions 
to supply the necessary defence. In BM, Lord Burnett CJ gave thoughtful consideration to 
the opinions of the minority in Brown, noting that Lords Mustill and Slynn would have 
accepted a defence in Brown for actual bodily harm or wounding, but not for more serious 
injury.84 His appraisal suggests that the courts may be more accommodating of those body 
modification procedures that result in less serious harm, but it fails to provide any 
definitive statement of the law.  
There is also a lack of clarity regarding the lawfulness of several common body modification 
procedures which may – without stretching the nomenclature – be cast as analogous with 
tattooing and piercing. For example, transdermal and subdermal implants (where 
materials are inserted below the skin) may be analogous to piercing, but do not readily fit 
the recognised definition of piercing - as something that makes a hole through part of the 
body. The legality of these procedures is then not clear from the judgment.  
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The Court also did not consider the position of cumulate modifications, for example several 
tongue piercings which, together and over a period of time, split the tongue.85 The 
individual piercings would fall under the piercing exemption – yet the overall result is an 
injury which is both serious and irreversible.  
Finally, Lord Burnett CJ’s remarks regarding the lawfulness of tattooing, piercing and 
“other body adornment”86 suggests that his Lordship may be drawing a distinction between 
procedures that augment the body and those where parts of the body are removed or 
mutilated. For the former, consent would be valid, but invalid for the latter. This would be 
an odd distinction to make. Procedures augmenting the body may cause serious and 
lasting harm – the example of “inserting a piece of metal at the base of the penis” given 
in the judgment of the court may be such an example.87  
Without informed consideration of the procedures which are offered by body modifiers, a 
clear and reasoned line between legality and illegality cannot be drawn. The courts are, as 
Lord Burnett CJ recognised, ill-equipped to understand the subtleties here.  
 
Raising the Threshold? 
Criticisms have been levelled at a regime that operates to restrict consent to violent acts 
causing bodily harm through category-based decision making. The exemptions have 
variously been described as “piecemeal and arbitrary”,88 created with “no real logic”89  and 
leaving the law in a state of “considerable uncertainty”.90 The decision in BM suggests the 
courts are unwilling to challenge the supremacy of Brown and their decision has, as 
discussed, done little to clarify the “considerable uncertainty” caused by category-based 
decision making.  
A fundamental overhaul of this area of the law would allow for a fresh approach. Tolmie 
has suggested that the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s reasoning in the case of Lee91 where 
we look firstly to the level of the harm caused and then – dependent upon the facts – allow 
or disallow a defence of consent offers a more practical alternative to our current regime.92 
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In Lee, the Court rejected the results-based test in Brown, preferring an approach where 
a “high value” is placed on personal autonomy.93 Under this more liberal regime where 
actual bodily harm is intended, or risked, consent is a defence, and for grievous bodily 
harm consent may be a defence, unless strong public policy considerations require the 
judge to withdraw the defence.94 Although personal autonomy is given more weight here 
the critical question that must be asked still involves public policy considerations, albeit 
the question of whether these justify withdrawing consent. It is suggested here that had 
Lord Burnett CJ been asked to address this question the same conclusion would have been 
reached. This said, adopting this regime would provide more legal certainty for those who 
perform body modification procedures which result in less serious injury.  
Consideration could instead be given to refreshing those categories which have been 
established in the common law. The decision in Brown was poorly received in 1993 and 
has since then become a bye-word for state interference with bodily autonomy. 
Overhauling the category-based exceptions and placing them on a statutory footing would 
bring clarity and an opportunity to hear from those experts and stakeholders spoken of in 
Brown and BM in order to craft appropriate and socially reflective category-based 
exceptions. Retaining category-based decision making would undoubtedly continue to 
restrict bodily autonomy - as a wholesale acceptance of body modifications for “good 
reason” would, itself, be extreme. Allowing unrestricted consent to modification 
procedures would be difficult to defend when the procedures range from the relatively 
moderate practices of body piercing and scarification through to more extreme procedures, 
such as the removal of body parts.95 The difficulty with introducing certainty through 
codification is that flexibility will be lost, and the law may then be unable to keep up with 
social change and be unable adapt to novel circumstances. Consideration could instead be 
given to clearly articulating the principles governing the exceptions – to drawing up a clear 
set of justifications for exempting activities that are less reliant on the amorphous concepts 
of “public interest” and reasonableness.  
The Law Commission certainly saw the dangers in failing to address the prevalence of body 
modifications in its 1995 Consultation Paper. As part of their suggestions for reform the 
Law Commission proposed raising the level of injury to which one could validly consent to 
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“seriously disabling injury”,96 suggesting that injuries which did not reach this criminal 
threshold could then be subject to regulation through “effective statutory controls”.97  
The Commission recognised that this would clarify the legal position for those who perform 
body modifications and envisaged a regulatory regime similar to that in place for tattooing 
and piercing; one that relies, in part, on self-regulation but also allows for the effective 
regulation of premises98 and the imposition of age restrictions.99  
The Commission’s recommendation would not necessarily exempt all the procedures 
performed in BM as consent would not negate liability where there was the 
“loss of a bodily member or organ or permanent bodily injury or permanent 
functional impairment, or serious or permanent disfigurement, or severe and 
prolonged pain, or serious impairment of mental health, or prolonged 
unconsciousness.” 100  
Under this regime the only procedure in BM which could possibly be validly consented to 
would be the tongue splitting. Tongue splitting does not result in the loss of a bodily part, 
nor, it is submitted here, does it result in a permanent disfigurement - if disfigurement is 
given its ordinary meaning of something that spoils a person’s outward appearance.  
While it is clearly necessary that the law to places a limit on the degree of injury to which 
an individual may consent raising that level of harm would allow for personal autonomy to 
be more robustly protected and more accurately reflect how this area is being policed. The 
courts may be unwilling to find there is any public interest in allowing consent to negate 
liability for body modification procedures - but the Crown Prosecution Service must take 
the public interest into account when deciding whether to prosecute and it is unlikely 
procedures resulting in less serious bodily harm, such as transdermal implants, will be 
prosecuted.  
 
Conclusion 
Twenty-five years after Brown, the courts are still unwilling to favour an individual’s claim 
to autonomy when the activity in question is a subcultural one. This flows from the stance 
adopted by the criminal law – that consensual acts causing bodily harm are, prima facie, 
unlawful - leaving the courts to grapple with the difficult questions of whether an activity 
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fits within an existing category, or whether public policy considerations would support the 
continuation of that activity. Those exceptional categories are incoherent, and Brown offers 
no clear rationale for why particular activities are, or should be, excepted. The decision in 
Brown, and now in BM, also suggests that the presumption of illegality when bodily harm 
is caused weighs heavily against the recognition of any new exceptions.  
This said, the judgment in BM was – allusions to mental illness aside – clearly reasoned 
and entirely predictable. Some procedures undertaken in M were surgical in nature and, 
as such, should not have been performed by an individual who is not licensed to perform 
surgery. That said, the decision was insufficiently nuanced. It is now clear that the 
procedures discussed in the judgment – the tongue splitting and the removal of body parts 
– result in injuries beyond that to which an individual can consent, yet there remains a 
lack of clarity in the legal position of procedures that cannot properly be described as 
either piercing or tattooing. 
The Court failed to appreciate that there are a number of commonplace procedures that 
result in serious injuries yet are no more dangerous than tattooing or piercing. If these 
body modification procedures are moved outside of the tattooing and piercing studios in 
which they currently take place then it is likely they will be performed in private premises 
in far less hygienic conditions, be undertaken by amateurs or be self-administered. If the 
Court were seeking to protect public health, then this decision may have the opposite 
effect.  
The legal position for body modification procedures that cause less serious harm is also 
entirely unclear. In BM, the Court may not have been tasked with clarifying the legality of 
less serious modifications, but this was a missed opportunity that places body modification 
practitioners in a difficult legal position.  
Body modification is a fast-growing industry and the regulation of this industry is not 
assisted by criminalisation. The terms piercing, and tattooing may have accurately 
captured socially acceptable forms of body modifications in the early 1990s, but society 
has moved on considerably since then and we cannot wait for judicial scrutiny of each 
emergent body modification procedure to reveal whether it is lawful. Allowing the body 
modification industry to self-regulate would address the principle concerns raised by the 
Court in M and would provide the necessary flexibility required to ensure these procedures 
are performed safely.   
 
